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The ability to test hypotheses, which has 
been postulated to play a central role in a va-
riety of cognitive processes (e. g. , Inhelder & 
Piaget, 1958; Neimark & Santa, 1975; Wason 
& Johnson-Laird, 1972), is one of those very 
general aspects of cognition that can be studied 
in some form at any level of development. At 
the level of formal operations, one might expect 
the development of relatively conscious hy-
pothesis testing based on conceptualization of 
hypotheses as such. Both Piagetian theory and 
available evidence (see below) suggest the in-
volvement of at least three cognitive capacities: 
(a) comprehension of implication relationships 
(if p then q; all p are q; or any logically isomor-
phic expression), since this is the form hypoth-
eses usually take; (b) falsification strategy, the 
realization that to test a hypothesis, one must 
seek information that would falsify it; and (c) 
nonverification insight, the realization that hy-
potheses are not conclusively verified by sup-
porting data. The aim of this study was to trace 
the development of these three aspects of hy-
pothesis-testing ability. 
Beginning with the first, one would expect 
implication comprehension to develop during 
adolescence, since implication is one of the 16 
bivariate relationships composing the complete 
combinatorial system—the lattice structure un-
derlying the stage of formal operations (Inhel-
der & Piaget, 1958). Of course, young children 
routinely succeed on various reasoning tasks 
apparently involving implications (e.g., Bourne 
& O’Banion, 1971; Kodroff & Roberge, 1975; 
Kuhn, 1977); the question is whether they con-
ceptualize the putative implications as such 
or, rather, assimilate them to a more primi-
tive cognitive structure. Studies analyzing in-
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It was postulated that formal operational hypothesis-testing ability includes at least three cognitive 
capacities: (a) implication comprehension, the ability to understand conditional relationships; (b) 
falsification strategy, the realization that to test a hypothesis, one must seek information that would 
falsify it; and(c) nonverification insight, the realization that hypotheses are not conclusively verified 
by supporting data. A total of 24 males in each of Grades 7, 10, and college evaluated data descrip-
tions with respect to each of four hypothesized implication relationships and chose an experiment 
to test each hypothesis. Results suggested three sequences of qualitative change in hypothesis-test-
ing ability: (a) from no systematic interpretation of conditionals to an implication interpretation, (b) 
from content-based information seeking to a falsification strategy, and (c) from a symmetrical con-
ception of truth and falsity to a non-verification insight. However, formal operational performance 
was far from universal, even in college students. 
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trasubject patterns across a range of deductive 
reasoning problems suggest that implication 
comprehension does not emerge until adoles-
cence (Staudenmayer & Bourne, 1977; Taplin, 
Staudenmayer, & Taddonio, 1974). 
Perhaps the most direct way to assess com-
prehension of a logical relationship between 
variables is to present a broad range of data 
descriptions and to see if people can correctly 
evaluate these as consistent or inconsistent with 
the relationship in question. Ward (1972) and 
Paris (1973) both used this evaluation proce-
dure to assess implication comprehension and 
found very poor performance even by adoles-
cents, with no developmental trends. One ex-
planation is that the implications in both of 
these studies involved arbitrary relationships(e. 
g., in the Paris study, “If the bird is in the nest, 
then the shoe is on the foot”), which seem to be 
a hindrance to mature reasoning (Bracewell & 
Hidi, 1974). In the present study, I attempted to 
show developing comprehension of implication 
during adolescence, using an evaluation proce-
dure with implications expressing a meaningful 
(causal) connection between meaningful terms. 
The second aspect of hypothesis-test-
ing ability—the strategy of testing hypothe-
ses by seeking disconfirmatory cases—has also 
been postulated to involve formal operations 
(Beth & Piaget, 1966, pp. 181–182). The cru-
cial importance of this falsification strategy to 
the complete combinatorial system is apparent 
when one considers the latter not as a juxtapo-
sition of implication and 15 other logical rela-
tionships but rather as a structure d’ensemble, 
that is, a tightly knit cognitive structure involv-
ing not only the component operations but the 
complex net of interrelationships linking them. 
Suppose, for example, that a formal operational 
thinker, having encountered several people who 
use fluoridated toothpaste (p) and have healthy 
teeth (q), as well as some who don’t use fluo-
ridated toothpaste ( p¯ ) and don’t have healthy 
teeth ( q¯ ), becomes interested in the relation-
ship between the use of fluoridated toothpaste 
and the health of one’s teeth. The available ev-
idence already rules out 12 possible relation-
ships, leaving four: (a) implication (if p then q), 
(b) converse implication (if q then p), (c) bicon-
ditionality (q if and only if p), and (d) complete 
affirmation (p and q mutually independent). To 
decide among these, the formal thinker consid-
ers their interrelationships and thus seeks infor-
mation to efficiently narrow down  the possibil-
ities. For example, seeking someone who does 
not use fluoridated toothpaste and does have 
healthy teeth ( p¯  • q) would be a useful experi-
ment, since such evidence would rule out con-
verse implication and biconditionality, leaving 
only implication and complete affirmation. One 
could decide between these latter by seeking 
people who use fluoridated toothpaste and don’t 
have healthy teeth ( p   • q¯ ), since they would rule 
out the implication relationship. 
The formal thinker thus reasons within the 
complete combinatorial system not by con-
firming particular relationships but by system-
atically excluding others, and this is accom-
plished by seeking falsifying information. Over 
the last decade, experiments involving Wason’s 
“four-card task” have generated considerable 
evidence regarding use of the falsification strat-
egy by college students. Although earlier stud-
ies showed surprisingly poor performance (Wa-
son & Johnson-Laird, 1972), recent data show 
greater achievement on versions of the four-
card task with meaningful content (e.g., Brace-
well & Hidi, 1974; Gilhooley & Falconer, 
1974), which is consistent with Piaget’s(1972) 
suggestion that formal operations may only be 
applied to familiar materials. There seems to be 
no published evidence regarding development 
of the falsification strategy, though unpublished 
work by Lunzer (Note 1) and Bady (Note 2) 
does suggest development trends during ado-
lescence, as Piaget’s theory predicts. The pres-
ent study used a variant of the four-card task to 
assess development of the falsification strategy. 
The third aspect of hypothesis-testing ability 
investigated was the realization that hypothe-
ses cannot be conclusively verified. The impor-
tance of this nonverification insight in formal 
operational thinking is implicit in the preced-
ing discussion of the complete combinato-
rial system as a structure d’ensemble: The for-
mal thinker does not attempt to verify directly 
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a particular relationship, realizing that no finite 
number of consistent instances would estab-
lish its truth. No matter how many people use 
fluoridated toothpaste and have healthy teeth, 
the hypothesis that all people who use fluori-
dated toothpaste have healthy teeth remains un-
proven, though it can easily be disconfirmed by 
a single person who uses fluoridated toothpaste 
and does not have healthy teeth. The nonveri-
fication insight reflects this crucial asymmetry 
between verification and falsification. 
There appears to be no published evidence 
directly relating to the nonverification insight. 
Several studies (Evans, 1972; Johnson-Laird & 
Tagart, 1969; Wason, 1968) have shown that col-
lege students typically evaluate certain consis-
tent information as making an implication rule 
true, but these subjects were not explicitly asked 
to evaluate the truth or falsity of the rule as a hy-
pothesis of potentially universal applicability. In 
the present study, subjects were asked to deter-
mine whether each of various pieces of informa-
tion proved conclusively that a given hypothe-
sis was always correct. Since the nonverification 
insight, like implication comprehension and the 
falsification strategy, is involved in the complete 
combinatorial system, it too was expected to de-
velop during adolescence. 
In order to assess generality of application 
of the three hypothesis-testing schemes, sev-
eral logical forms and content areas were used 
in constructing the hypotheses presented to the 
subjects. On the basis of available data show-
ing the nonuniversality of formal operations in 
adults (Neimark, 1975; Piaget, 1972) and ma-
jor effects of form and content on reasoning (e. 
g. , Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972), it was ex-
pected that consistent application of these hy-
pothesis-testing schemes would be far from 
universal even in college students. 
Method
Subjects
A total of 24 male volunteers in each of Grades 7, 10, and 
college participated in the experiment. The seventh and 
tenth graders attended a highly selective, all-male, private 
school, and the college students lived in two Rutgers Uni-
versity dormitories. Mean ages (and standard deviations) 
for Grades 7, 10, and college, respectively were 12 years 
10 months (4. 6 months), 15 years 9 months (4. 4 months) 
and 19 years 4 months (7. 3 months). Five of the college 
students had taken a course in logic, but they performed no 
better than the others. 
Materials
A five-page test booklet was prepared for each subject. 
The first page presented general instructions, including the 
following: 
In each of the following problems you will 
have a theory1 that you want to test. Do not as-
sume that the theory is true. A theory is a rule that 
might be true and might be false. Testing a theory 
means trying to find out whether it is true or false. 
Proving a theory is true means that you find out 
for sure that it is always right. Proving a theory 
is false means that you find out for sure that it is 
sometimes wrong. 
Each of the next four pages presented a hypothesis (e.g., “If 
a person uses fluoridated toothpaste he will have healthy 
teeth” is a hypothesis of the form If p then q), followed by 
these instructions: 
For each of the following people, what conclusion 
would you reach about the theory? Check Proves 
True if you think this person shows for sure that 
the theory is right. Check Proves False if you 
think this person shows for sure that the theory is 
wrong. Check No Proof if you think this person 
does not show for sure whether the theory is right 
or wrong. 
Next came eight data descriptions of the form p • q (p and 
q ), p •  q¯  (p and not q), p¯ • q, p¯ • q¯ , q• p, q • p¯ ,  q¯  • p, and  q¯ 
• p¯ , with space next to each for the subject to check proves 
true, proves false, or no proof. For example, given the hy-
pothesis above, the eight data descriptions would read: Al-
bert uses fluoridated toothpaste and has healthy teeth, Ber-
tie uses fluoridated toothpaste and does not have healthy 
teeth, and so on. Following this part of each page, the sub-
ject was asked to decide whether it would be better to test 
the hypothesis by studying qs or by studying qs (in each 
case to see whether they are p or p¯ ). In the above exam-
ple, the choice would be between (a) asking patients with 
healthy teeth whether they use fluoridated toothpaste and 
(b) asking patients who don’t have healthy teeth whether 
they use fluoridated toothpaste (which is the correct choice, 
since only people who use fluoridated toothpaste and don’t 
have healthy teeth disprove the hypothesis). Finally, at the 
bottom of each page, the subject was asked to explain the 
basis for this choice between two experiments. 
Design
The four test pages in each booklet were selected from a 
set of 16, identical in format but differing in the hypothesis 
1 For the benefit of the younger subjects, hypotheses were 
referred to as theories throughout the experiment.
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(“theory”) presented. The 16 hypotheses were produced by 
factorially combining 4 logical forms (if p then q; all p are 
q; if p then  q¯ ; no p are q) with 4 content areas (toothpaste 
fluoridation, student performance, canine character, and au-
tomotive maintenance). Thus, the 4 hypotheses for the con-
tent area toothpaste were: (a) “If a person uses fluoridated 
toothpaste he will have healthy teeth, (b) all people who 
use fluoridated toothpaste have healthy teeth, (c) if a person 
uses fluoridated toothpaste, he will not get cavities, and (d) 
no one who uses fluoridated toothpaste gets cavities.”2
Since only 4 of the 16 factorial combinations of form 
and content were used in each test booklet and since they 
had to be arranged in some order, the variables form, con-
tent, and serial position were necessarily confounded 
within any test booklet. By constructing the test booklets 
in groups of four, however, it was possible to use a Greco-
Latin square design in which (a) each form, each content 
area, and of course each serial position appeared exactly 
once in each test booklet, and (b) the variables form, con-
tent, and position were mutually orthogonal within sets of 
four booklets. Three Greco-Latin squares were randomly 
selected and used to construct 12 variants of the test book-
let, each of which was used by two subjects at each grade 
level. It was thus possible to analyze the main effects of 
age, form, content, and position, as well as the interaction 
of age with form, with content, and with position. Planned 
comparisons within the variable form were also under-
taken, involving (a) positive (if p then q; all p are q) versus 
negative (if p then q¯; no p are q) forms, (b) connective (if . . 
. then) versus quantified (all; no) wordings, (c) the interac-
tion of a and b, and (d) the interaction of each of the above 
with age (in the case of c, a three-way interaction). 
Procedure 
Subjects were tested in groups of up to four students. 
The experimenter handed out test booklets and read the 
cover sheet aloud, emphasizing the italicized words, while 
the students read along in their own booklets. After solicit-
ing questions, the experimenter asked the subjects to turn 
to the next page and pointed out that they each had a “the-
ory” written on top of the page. He then read aloud the in-
structions following the theory, still emphasizing the ital-
icized words. Questions were again solicited, after which 
each subject continued on his own. The experimenter re-
mained present in case of difficulties, but even the sev-
enth graders apparently had little trouble understanding the 
instructions. 
Results and Discussion
Implication 
Comprehension of implication was inferred 
from subjects’ evaluations of the eight data de-
scriptions for each hypothesis. To be credited 
with an implication interpretation, a subject had 
to produce an evaluation pattern meeting three 
criteria: (a) each of the last four data descrip-
tions was evaluated identically with its logi-
cally identical counterpart among the first four; 
(b) the subject correctly evaluated as disconfir-
matory those data descriptions—and only those 
data descriptions—that indeed disconfirmed the 
hypothesis; and (c) any data descriptions evalu-
ated as verifying were not such as to indicate a 
biconditional interpretation (e.g., identical eval-
uation of p • q and p¯ • q¯ ).3 The mean numbers 
of implication interpretations (out of 4 possi-
ble) for subjects in Grades 7, 10, and college, 
respectively, were .75, 1.71, and 2.42 (see Ta-
ble 1). Trend analysis revealed a significant lin-
ear trend, F(1, 69) = 18.36, p < .001, and insig-
nificant deviation from linearity, F(1, 69) < 1. 
The most common alternative evaluation 
patterns reflected biconditionality (interpre-
tation of if as if and only if). The criteria for 
biconditionality were that (a) each of the last 
four data descriptions was evaluated identically 
with its counterpart among the first four; and 
also (b1) data descriptions matching both ante-
cedent and consequent of the conditional (e.g., 
2 The meaning of q changes from “healthy teeth” in the 
first two hypotheses to “getting cavities” in the last two. 
If q had been held constant (referring to healthy teeth in 
all four forms), these last two hypotheses would have ex-
pressed a negative rather than positive relationship between 
fluoridation and health of teeth and thus differed from the 
first two hypotheses in content as well as form of expres-
sion. Analogous changes were made in the meaning of q in 
the other three content areas such that the hypothetical rela-
tionship expressed remained essentially unchanged across 
the four logical forms. This change in q across the four 
forms within each content area was not a source of confu-
sion for subjects, since each subject was exposed to only 
one form in any content area. 
3 Inconsistent evaluations were disallowed on the 
grounds that a formal approach to data evaluation would 
recognize when superficially different data descriptions are 
formally identical. Evaluations suggesting a biconditional 
interpretation were disallowed on the basis of previous data 
(cited below) that biconditionality is a common misinter-
pretation of conditional statements. Reanalysis of the data 
using a very lax criterion (only the first four data descrip-
tions were considered, and these simply had to meet cri-
terion b) resulted in the same pattern of results with re-
spect to age differences and the effects of task variables, 
though overall level of performance was naturally some-
what higher. 
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p • q¯ and q  • p for if p then q) and those match-
ing neither (e.g., p • q and q • p for if p then 
q) were all evaluated as verifying, and/or (b2) 
descriptions matching the antecedent or con-
sequent but not both (e.g., p • q¯ , q • p¯ , p¯ • q, 
and  q¯ • p for if  p then q) were all evaluated 
as falsifying. For Grades 7, 10, and college, re-
spectively, the mean numbers of biconditional 
interpretations (out of four possible) were .96, 
.58, and .58 (age trend nonsignificant). Many 
previous studies have also found the bicon-
ditional to be a prevalent misinterpretation of 
conditional statements (e.g., Paris, 1973; Tap-
lin et al., 1974). Perhaps the symmetry of the 
biconditional makes it easier to comprehend, so 
people unable to grasp implication instead as-
similate the conditional to the simpler bicondi-
tionality strategy. 
Most response patterns other than implica-
tion and biconditionality were inconsistent in 
that logically identical data descriptions were 
evaluated differently. Mean numbers of incon-
sistent interpretations (out of 4 possible) for 
Grades 7, 10, and college, respectively, were 
1.92, 1.50, and .71. This decline, linear trend 
F(1, 69)= 13.32, p < .001, considered together 
with the lack of an age trend for bicondition-
ality, suggests a developmental sequence from 
inconsistent data evaluations to implication in-
terpretation, with biconditionality very likely 
an intermediate step in at least some cases. 
All three task variables showed significant 
effects. Planned comparisons revealed that 
the effect of logical form was entirely due to a 
higher proportion of implication interpretations 
for negative hypothesis forms(47%) than for 
positive forms (34%), F(1, 189) = 11.15, p < 
.01. This superficially conflicts with extensive 
evidence that negation hinders mature reason-
ing (e.g., Moshman, 1977; Wason & Johnson-
Laird, 1972), but it is consistent with evidence 
that negative universals (no p are q) are bet-
ter comprehended than positive universals (all 
p are q) (Neimark & Chapman, 1975) and that 
negation of the consequent (q) of an implica-
tion may facilitate reasoning (Roberge, 1971; 
Wildman & Fletcher, 1977), or at least not hin-
der it (Roberge, 1974). This may be because 
such forms as If p then q¯ and No p are q em-
phasize the single falsifying instance (p • q). 
The other two main effects were (a) a sub-
stantial difference in difficulty among the four 
content areas, F(3, 189) = 12.47, p < .001, with 
proportions of implication interpretation rang-
ing from 28% to 33% to 42% to 60% for dog, 
student, toothpaste, and engine, respectively, 
and (b) an increase in implication interpreta-
tions from 36% to 46% across the four pages of 
the test(linear trend F(1, 189) = 4.52, p < .05). 
None of these task variables interacted signif-
icantly with age: The developmental trend in 
implication interpretation held for all four log-
ical forms, all four content areas, and all four 
serial positions. 
Falsification Strategy
Use of a falsification strategy was inferred 
for each subject on each hypothesis from (a) 
his choice between the two experiments and 
(b) his explanation of this choice. Choice alone 
was not a useful criterion because the prob-
Table 1. Frequency of Implication, Defended Fal-
sification, and Nonverification Responses at Each 
Grade
No. responses
Grade  0  1  2  3  4  Total
Implication
7  14 6 2 0 2 24
10  4 8 6 3 3 24
College 3 6 3 2 10 24
 Total   21 20 11 5 15 72
Falsification
7  18 4 1 1 0 24
10  9 3 6 0 6 24
College 10 2 2 2 8 24
 Total  37 9 9 3 14 72
Nonverification
7  23 1 0 0 0 24 
10  20 2 0 1 1 24
College 15 1 0 0 8 24
 Total  58 4 0 1 9 72
Note. Each subject could give up to four correct responses 
for each of the three aspects of hypothesis testing. 
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ability of a correct guess was 50%. Explana-
tions were categorized (by a coder unaware of 
the subject’s age) as reflecting falsification pro-
vided the subject either (a) explicitly indicated 
that one should test the hypothesis by trying to 
prove it false or (b) cited as the crucial consid-
eration a potential datum which, according to 
his own data evaluations, would prove the hy-
pothesis false. Recoding of 50 randomly se-
lected explanations by an independent coder 
showed 94% agreement. 
To be credited with use of a falsification 
strategy, a subject had to choose the experiment 
that could falsify the hypothesis in question and 
defend this choice with a falsification explana-
tion. As Table 1 indicates, the mean numbers of 
defended falsification choices (out of 4 possi-
ble) for Grades 7, 10, and college, respectively, 
were .38, 1.63, and 1.83, a significant linear 
trend, F(1, 69) = 11.85, p < .001, with insignifi-
cant deviation from linearity, F(1, 69) = 2.02. 
Further examination of subjects’ choices re-
vealed an interesting pattern. Of the 42 sub-
jects erring on at least one of the positive hy-
pothesis forms (i.e., failing to choose q in both 
cases), 57% chose q in both cases, which sig-
nificantly exceeds chance expectation of 33%, 
χ2(1) = 10.71, p < .01. This is consistent with 
Johnson-Laird and Wason’s (1970; Wason & 
Johnson-Laird, 1972) thesis that many people 
attempt to verify a given hypothesis rather than 
falsify it. Given the hypothesis If a person uses 
fluoridated toothpaste, he/she will have healthy 
teeth, for example, the verification strategy 
would be to study people with healthy teeth, 
on the assumption that if such people use flu-
oridated toothpaste it verifies the hypothesis. 
The present evidence suggests that this strat-
egy is limited to positive forms (e.g. , if p then 
q). Perhaps people are more likely to see such 
hypotheses as inductive generalizations of cer-
tain types of evidence (p • q), and thus are more 
likely to test them by accumulating more such 
evidence, not realizing that accumulation of 
positive instances does not test a hypothesis un-
less it is accomplished in such a way that nega-
tive instances could have turned up. 
The number of subjects (out of 24) who 
showed a verification pattern in their responses 
to positive forms was 5, 10, and 9 for Grades 
7, 10, and college, respectively. This consti-
tuted only 29% of all error patterns for posi-
tive forms in Grade 7, but 71% in Grade 10 and 
82% for college students, χ2(2) = 9.22, p < .01, 
suggesting that a verification orientation to-
ward positive forms was an increasingly impor-
tant source of error with increasing age. 
However, inferring strategies from choice 
patterns is not without its dangers. In order to 
obtain further information on use of the verifi-
cation strategy, as well as to investigate strate-
gies used for negative hypothesis forms and by 
younger subjects, an examination of nonfalsifi-
cation explanations was undertaken. Verifica-
tion explanations—in which the subject either 
(a) explicitly indicated that one should test the 
hypothesis by trying to prove it true or (b) cited 
as the crucial consideration a potential datum 
which, according to his own data evaluations, 
would prove the hypothesis true—accounted 
for 16% of all nonfalsification explanations, 
though in contrast to the choice pattern results 
above, this did not vary as a function of age or 
hypothesis form. 
The major source of error revealed in the ex-
planations was a tendency to ignore the form of 
the hypothesis and the structure of the hypoth-
esis-testing task and to respond instead to idio-
syncratic aspects of the content area (e.g., one 
should study people with healthy teeth “because 
a patient with healthy teeth would be most 
likely to explain why his teeth were healthy 
and what measures he took to keep them in 
that condition”). Such explanations, resembling 
the sort of reasoning reported in cross-cultural 
work by Cole and Scribner (1973), accounted 
for 71% of all explanations in Grade 7, 18% in 
Grade 10, and 9% for all college students. One 
could thus postulate a developmental sequence 
from content-based hypothesis testing to falsifi-
cation strategy, with verification strategy a pos-
sible intermediate step, at least in the case of 
positive hypotheses. Since verification strategy, 
like falsification strategy, involves consider-
ation of hypothesis form and task structure, it is 
a plausible transitional pattern, though the pres-
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ent cross-sectional data cannot show that it is a 
necessary prerequisite for falsification. 
The only significant main effect of a task 
variable was a difference between content ar-
eas. Proportions of defended falsification 
choices were 26%, 28%, 35%, and 39% for 
dog, student, engine, and toothpaste, respec-
tively, F(3, 189) = 3.05, p < .05. No simple ex-
planation for the effect of content seems fea-
sible, since the relative difficulty of the four 
content areas with respect to falsification dif-
fers from their relative difficulty with respect to 
implication comprehension. 
There was only one significant interaction—
Age × Positive versus Negative Forms, F(2, 
189) = 4.11, p < .05—and even this interac-
tion did not seriously comprise the main effect 
for age: Post hoc Scheffe tests revealed sig-
nificantly better performance by tenth graders 
than by seventh graders for both positive, F(5, 
282) = 15.39, p < .05, and negative, F(5, 282) = 
45.91, p < . 001, forms, and nonsignificant dif-
ferences between tenth graders and college stu-
dents in each case. Thus, the existence and di-
rection of the age trend in falsification strategy 
was not a function of form, content, or serial 
position. 
Nonverification
A subject demonstrated nonverification in-
sight for any hypothesis by (a) not choosing 
any of the eight data descriptions as conclu-
sively verifying the hypothesis and (b) choos-
ing at least one data description(any one) as 
conclusively falsifying it. Occasional re-
sponse patterns recognizing the impossibility 
of conclusive verification (thus meeting crite-
rion a) but considering conclusive falsification 
equally impossible (thus not meeting criterion 
b) were not considered to reflect nonverifica-
tion, since they seem to be based not on in-
sight into the asymmetrical nature of truth and 
falsity but rather on a generally skeptical at-
titude concerning the possibility of reaching 
conclusions. As Table 1 indicates, the mean 
numbers of nonverification patterns (out of 
4 possible) for Grades 7, 10, and college, re-
spectively, were .04, .38, and 1.38, a signifi-
cant (though modest) linear trend, F(1, 69) = 
13.60, p < .001, with insignificant deviation 
from linearity, F(1, 69) = 1.13).4 A tendency 
to cite data descriptions “fitting” the hypothe-
sis (e.g., p • q for hypotheses of the form If p 
then q) as conclusively verifying it accounted 
for 53% of all errors, and is consistent with the 
verification strategy discussed above. The re-
sulting evaluation patterns typically resembled 
the modal “defective truth table” (e.g., for If  
p then q,  p • q is confirming, p • q¯ disconfirm-
ing, and p¯  • q and p¯  • q¯  irrelevant) found in 
previous research (Evans, 1972; Johnson-Laird 
& Tagart, 1969; Wason, 1968). 
One explanation for the scarcity of the non-
verification insight is that most people do not 
sufficiently distinguish data and hypotheses. 
Rather, the two are seen as co-existing in the 
same general realm: If there is a fit between hy-
pothesis and datum, this is seen as verifying 
both; if there is a mismatch, it is seen as fal-
sifying. With the development of formal op-
erations, there is an increasingly habitual and 
systematic orientation toward possibilities and 
increasing grasp of the subtle but crucial rela-
tionship between possibility and reality (In-
helder & Piaget, 1958). In terms of hypothesis 
testing, the formal thinker would coordinate hy-
potheses to the level of possibility and data to 
the level of reality. Perhaps only late in the de-
velopment of formal operations (in those who 
progress this far) is the subordination of real-
ity to possibility sufficiently advanced for the 
individual to grasp the fundamental asymme-
try of truth and falsity—the fact that hypothe-
ses of the sort used in this experiment can be 
proven false by a single disconfirming instance, 
but cannot, in an infinite world, be conclusively 
proven true. 
As Table 1 shows, subjects were fairly 
consistent in applying or not applying the 
4 The bimodal nature of the response distribution in this 
case probably violates the assumption of normality more 
than is allowable even for a test as robust as analysis of 
variance, and thus the level of significance for the linear 
age trend may be inflated. However, the reality of the age 
trend is hard to doubt: It is unlikely that eight of the nine 
consistently correct subjects would have been at the highest 
grade level due to chance alone (p < .001, binomial test). 
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nonverification insight. There were no main ef-
fects for task variables, nor were there any in-
teractions with age. 
Conclusions
The results suggest three sequences of qual-
itative change in hypothesis-testing ability: (a) 
from no systematic interpretation of condition-
als to implication interpretation, (b) from con-
tent-based information seeking to falsification 
strategy, and (c) from a symmetrical concep-
tion of truth and falsity to nonverification in-
sight. Several promising lines for further inves-
tigation may be noted. First, longitudinal and 
clinical investigations would be useful in fur-
ther exploring the details of these developmen-
tal trends and their interrelations. Second, from 
a practical point of view, it would be useful to 
study the relation of hypothesis-testing ability 
to students’ level of comprehension of courses 
in the natural and social sciences. For exam-
ple, lack of the nonverification insight might 
be associated with a tendency toward uncriti-
cal acceptance of scientific (and pseudoscien-
tific) theories as fact. Third, it would be of both 
practical and theoretical import to see how and 
to what extent the development of hypothesis-
testing ability may be facilitated. Finally, from 
a theoretical point of view, we need empirical 
and conceptual work relating hypothesis-test-
ing ability to the emergence of such currently 
studied abilities as the control of variables, the 
design of factorial experiments, the abstrac-
tion and formulation of generalizations, and the 
comprehension of causal relationships, with the 
goal of ultimately generating a broad and pow-
erful conception of the development of scien-
tific reasoning. 
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